arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1606.08333cs.AIcs.LOcs.MA
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真实的谎言

True Lies

University of Bergen(卑尔根大学);Zhejiang University(浙江大学);University of Lorraine(洛林大学);Peking University(北京大学)

Thomas Ågotnes, Hans van Ditmarsch, Yanjing Wang

摘要:

一个真正的谎言是一个谎言,当宣布成为真实。在宣告的逻辑中,宣告的代理人没有被建模,真正的谎言是一个公式(它是假的),当宣告时变成真的。我们调查真实的谎言和其他类型的相互作用之间宣布的公式,他们的先决条件和后置条件,在设置Gerbrandy的逻辑相信公告,其中代理人可能有或获得不正确的信念。我们的结果是满足性和有效性的实例化这些语义定义的类别,迭代公告,包括任意经常迭代公告,和句法表征。我们关闭的结果迭代公告的逻辑知识(而不是信仰),并撒谎作为私人公告(而不是公共公告)不同的代理。详细的例子说明了我们说谎的概念。

英文摘要:

A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy's logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements) to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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