arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1606.05893cs.SIphysics.soc-ph
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你是你知道的人,你是如何表现的:通过用户的社交朋友和行为进行属性推断攻击

You are Who You Know and How You Behave: Attribute Inference Attacks via Users' Social Friends and Behaviors

Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Bin Liu

摘要:

我们提出了新的隐私攻击来推断属性(例如,位置、职业和兴趣)。我们的攻击利用在线社交网络中公开的看似无辜的用户信息来推断目标用户的缺失属性。鉴于越来越多的可用性(看似无辜的)用户信息在线,我们的研究结果有严重的影响互联网隐私-私人属性可以推断从用户的公开数据,除非我们采取措施,以保护用户免受这种推理攻击。为了推断目标用户的属性,现有的推断攻击利用用户的公开可用的社交朋友或用户的行为记录(例如,用户在Facebook上喜欢的网页,用户在Google Play上评论的应用程序),但不是两者都有。正如我们将展示的,这种推理攻击的成功率有限。然而,如果我们同时考虑社会朋友和行为记录,问题就有了质的不同。为了应对这一挑战,我们开发了一种新的模型来整合社交好友和行为记录,并根据我们的模型设计新的攻击。我们从理论上和实验上证明了我们的攻击的有效性。例如,我们观察到,在一个拥有110万用户的真实世界大规模数据集中,我们的攻击可以正确地推断出57%的用户所在的城市,通过置信度估计,如果攻击者选择性地攻击一半的用户,我们能够将攻击成功率提高到90%以上。此外,我们表明,我们的攻击可以正确地推断属性显着更多的用户比以前的攻击。

英文摘要:

We propose new privacy attacks to infer attributes (e.g., locations, occupations, and interests) of online social network users. Our attacks leverage seemingly innocent user information that is publicly available in online social networks to infer missing attributes of targeted users. Given the increasing availability of (seemingly innocent) user information online, our results have serious implications for Internet privacy -- private attributes can be inferred from users' publicly available data unless we take steps to protect users from such inference attacks. To infer attributes of a targeted user, existing inference attacks leverage either the user's publicly available social friends or the user's behavioral records (e.g., the webpages that the user has liked on Facebook, the apps that the user has reviewed on Google Play), but not both. As we will show, such inference attacks achieve limited success rates. However, the problem becomes qualitatively different if we consider both social friends and behavioral records. To address this challenge, we develop a novel model to integrate social friends and behavioral records and design new attacks based on our model. We theoretically and experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks. For instance, we observe that, in a real-world large-scale dataset with 1.1 million users, our attack can correctly infer the cities a user lived in for 57% of the users, via confidence estimation, we are able to increase the attack success rate to over 90% if the attacker selectively attacks a half of the users. Moreover, we show that our attack can correctly infer attributes for significantly more users than previous attacks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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