arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1605.08808cs.CR
收藏

审查员延迟阻止规避代理

Censors' Delay in Blocking Circumvention Proxies

David Fifield, Lynn Tsai

摘要:

互联网审查员必须不断发现和阻止新的规避代理服务器。我们试图理解这个过程;具体来说,当代理第一次变得可访问时,当它实际上被阻止时,延迟的长度。我们在混淆的Tor桥的情况下测量这种延迟,通过测试它们引入Tor浏览器之前和之后的可达性。我们在美国的一些地方进行测试,中国和伊朗,为期五个月。中国的国家防火墙在延迟了2到36天后封锁了新的桥梁。阻塞只发生在最终用户软件发布之后,尽管桥接器可以通过其他渠道更早地被阻塞。虽然防火墙最终发现了Tor浏览器的桥接器,但那些只出现在Orbot(Tor的移动设备版本)中的桥接器仍然没有被阻止。我们的研究结果强调了这样一个事实,即审查者可以以违背直觉的方式行事,这给威胁建模带来了困难,但也为逃避提供了机会。

英文摘要:

Censors of the Internet must continually discover and block new circumvention proxy servers. We seek to understand this process; specifically, the length of the delay between when a proxy first becomes discoverable and when it is actually blocked. We measure this delay in the case of obfuscated Tor bridges, by testing their reachability before and after their introduction into Tor Browser. We test from sites in the U.S., China, and Iran, over a period of five months. China's national firewall blocked new bridges after a varying delay of between 2 and 36 days. Blocking occurred only after end-user software releases, despite bridges being potentially discoverable earlier through other channels. While the firewall eventually discovered the bridges of Tor Browser, those that appeared only in Orbot, a version of Tor for mobile devices, remained unblocked. Our findings highlight the fact that censors can behave in ways that defy intuition, presenting difficulties for threat modeling but also opportunities for evasion.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑