检测删失检测
Detecting Censor Detection
摘要:
我们的目标是实证发现如何审查反应的引入新的代理服务器,可以用来规避他们的信息控制。我们研究了一个特定的案例,即混淆的Tor桥,并进行了旨在发现审查者需要多长时间才能阻止它们(如果他们确实阻止的话)的实验。通过对中国、伊朗、哈萨克斯坦和其他国家一年的积极测量,我们了解到桥梁何时被堵塞。在中国,我们发现了最有趣的行为,包括阻塞前的长时间和不同的延迟,在阻塞的桥梁变得可达期间的频繁故障,以及在实验中途阻塞技术的进步。在整个过程中,我们观察到审查人员令人惊讶的行为,与我们的预测不一致,对我们的假设提出了质疑,并提出了潜在的未开发的规避途径。
英文摘要:
Our goal is to empirically discover how censors react to the introduction of new proxy servers that can be used to circumvent their information controls. We examine a specific case, that of obfuscated Tor bridges, and conduct experiments designed to discover how long it takes censors to block them (if they do block at all). Through a year's worth of active measurements from China, Iran, Kazakhstan, and other countries, we learn when bridges become blocked. In China we found the most interesting behavior, including long and varying delays before blocking, frequent failures during which blocked bridges became reachable, and an advancement in blocking technique midway through the experiment. Throughout, we observed surprising behavior by censors, not in accordance with what we would have predicted, calling into question our assumptions and suggesting potential untapped avenues for circumvention.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。