科学与幻想

摘要：

大多数人都同意，波普尔的可证伪性标准未能在科学和伪科学之间提供一个有用的分界线，因为特设假设总是能够拯救任何与经验数据相冲突的理论。Duhem-Quine问题），并且缺乏ad-hoc假设的表征。此外，添加一些可测试的预测并不是很困难。应该强调的是，这些问题并不是简单地使波普尔的划界近似（如果是这样，我们所有的问题都将得到解决！），他们让它变得毫无用处更一般地说，目前没有任何哲学的划界标准能够排除甚至一些最明显的伪科学情况，甚至不能近似地（在任何明确定义的近似意义上）。这与我们坚信某些理论显然不科学的观点形成了鲜明的对比。这种信念从何而来？在本文中，我认为，这是必要的和可能的认识的概念，句法简单性，能够告诉经验等价的科学和非科学理论之间的区别，与信心，是足够的许多重要的实际目的，它完全同意的判断，一般在科学界举行。

英文摘要：

It is mostly agreed that Popper's criterion of falsifiability fails to provide a useful demarcation between science and pseudo-science, because ad-hoc assumptions are always able to save any theory that conflicts with the empirical data (a.k.a. the Duhem-Quine problem), and a characterization of ad-hoc assumptions is lacking. Moreover, adding some testable predictions is not very difficult. It should be emphasized that these problems do not simply make Popper's demarcation approximate (if it were so, all our problems would be solved!), they make it totally useless. More in general, no philosophical criterion of demarcation is presently able to rule out even some of the most blatant cases of pseudo-science, not even approximatively (in any well defined sense of approximation). This is in sharp contrast with our firm belief that some theories are clearly not scientific. Where does this belief come from? In this paper I argue that it is necessary and possible to recognize the notion of syntactic simplicity that is able to tell the difference between empirically equivalent scientific and non-scientific theories, with a confidence that is adequate to many important practical purposes, and it fully agrees with the judgments generally held in the scientific community.

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