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arXiv 1604.06329math.OC
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交换随机对策

Commutative Stochastic Games

Xavier Venel

摘要:

我们感兴趣的是当n趋于无穷大时n阶段博弈的值的收敛性,以及在具有一般状态集和有限行动集的随机对策中一致值的存在性,其中转移是可交换的。这意味着先播放动作简档a 1,再播放动作简档a 2,会导致与先播放动作简档a 2,然后播放动作简档a 1相同的状态分布。例如,吸收博弈可以重新表述为交换随机对策。当只有一个局中人且转移函数是确定性的时,我们证明了纯策略一致值的存在意味着0-最优策略的存在。在二人随机对策的框架下,研究了一类状态集为Rm,转移为确定性的,且L1范数为1-Lipschitz的对策,并证明了这类对策具有一致值.一个类似的证明表明在非零和情况下存在一个均衡。如果考虑有限重复博弈的一般模型,这些结果仍然成立,其中过渡是可交换的,并且参与者观察过去的行为而不是状态。

英文摘要:

We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative. This means that playing an action profile a 1 followed by an action profile a 2 , leads to the same distribution on states as playing first the action profile a 2 and then a 1. For example, absorbing games can be reformulated as commutative stochastic games. When there is only one player and the transition function is deterministic, we show that the existence of a uniform value in pure strategies implies the existence of 0-optimal strategies. In the framework of two-player stochastic games, we study a class of games where the set of states is R m and the transition is deterministic and 1-Lipschitz for the L 1-norm, and prove that these games have a uniform value. A similar proof shows the existence of an equilibrium in the non zero-sum case. These results remain true if one considers a general model of finite repeated games, where the transition is commutative and the players observe the past actions but not the state.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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