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arXiv 1603.07689cs.GT
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社会存储网络的稳定性、效率和内容

Stability, Efficiency, and Contentedness of Social Storage Networks

Pramod Mane, Kapil Ahuja, Nagarajan Krishnamurthy

摘要:

社交存储系统是现有的本地、集中和P2P备份数据备份系统的一个很好的替代方案。在本文中,我们将探讨社会存储系统的两个未触及的方面。一个方面涉及将社交存储建模为内生社交网络,其中代理自己决定他们想要与谁建立数据备份关系。第二个方面涉及研究社会存储系统的稳定性,这将有助于降低维护成本,并进一步帮助建立高效和满足的网络。我们有四个方面的贡献,包括上述两个方面。首先,我们将社会存储系统建模为战略网络形成博弈。我们在两个不同的框架下定义网络中每个代理的效用。其次,我们提出了双边稳定性的概念,它完善了Jackson等人定义的成对稳定性概念。1996年,通过要求双方同意添加和删除链接,而不是只同意添加链接。在社交存储环境中,相互同意删除链接尤其重要。第三,我们证明了社会存储网络双边稳定的充分必要条件。对于对称的社会存储网络,我们证明了存在一个唯一的邻域大小,独立于代理的数量(对于所有非平凡的情况下),没有对代理有任何激励,以增加或减少他们的邻域大小。我们称这个邻域大小为稳定点。第四,鉴于代理和其他参数的数量,我们讨论双边稳定的网络将发展,并讨论这些稳定的网络是有效的-也就是说,稳定的网络与所有代理的效用最大的总和。我们还讨论了如何建立满意的网络,其中每个代理实现最大可能的效用。

英文摘要:

Social storage systems are a good alternative to existing data backup systems of local, centralized, and P2P backup. In this paper, we look at two untouched aspects of social storage systems. One aspect involves modelling social storage as an endogenous social network, where agents themselves decide with whom they want to build data backup relation. The second aspect involves studying the stability of social storage systems, which would help reduce maintenance costs and further, help build efficient as well as contented networks. We have a four fold contribution that covers the above two aspects. We, first, model the social storage system as a strategic network formation game. We define the utility of each agent in the network under two different frameworks. Second, we propose the concept of bilateral stability which refines the pairwise stability concept defined by Jackson et. al. 1996, by requiring mutual consent for both addition and deletion of links, as compared to mutual consent just for link addition. Mutual consent for link deletion is especially important in the social storage setting. Third, we prove necessary and the sufficient conditions for bilateral stability of social storage networks. For symmetric social storage networks, we prove that there exists a unique neighborhood size, independent of the number of agents (for all non-trivial cases), where no pair of agents has any incentive to increase or decrease their neighborhood size. We call this neighborhood size as the stability point. Fourth, given the number of agents and other parameters, we discuss which bilaterally stable networks would evolve and also discuss which of these stable networks are efficient --- that is, stable networks with maximum sum of utilities of all agents. We also discuss ways to build contented networks, where each agent achieves the maximum possible utility.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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