关于双密钥三次DES的安全性
On the security of 2-key triple DES
AI总结：
本文重新评估了双密钥三次DES的安全性，提出改进的攻击方法，挑战了其80位安全性和定期更换密钥的可靠性，指出其安全余量有限，需尽快替换。
摘要：
本文重新审视了双密钥三次DES所提供的安全性，这是一种尽管最近被NIST去标准化但仍广泛使用的加密技术。本文描述了van Oorschot-Wiener攻击的泛化形式，构成了自1990年以来对双密钥三次DES的首次密码分析进展。我们进一步提出了攻击增强方法，表明广泛使用的80位安全估计不再保守；广泛陈述的“只要定期更换密钥即可安全”的说法也受到挑战。主要结论是，尽管双密钥三次DES未被彻底破解，但其安全余量很窄，应尽快替换，至少使用其三密钥变体。
英文摘要：
This paper reconsiders the security offered by 2-key triple DES, an encryption technique that remains widely used despite recently being de-standardised by NIST. A generalisation of the 1990 van Oorschot-Wiener attack is described, constituting the first advance in cryptanalysis of 2-key triple DES since 1990. We give further attack enhancements that together imply that the widely used estimate that 2-key triple DES provides 80 bits of security can no longer be regarded as conservative; the widely stated assertion that the scheme is secure as long as the key is changed regularly is also challenged. The main conclusion is that, whilst not completely broken, the margin of safety for 2-key triple DES is slim, and efforts to replace it, at least with its 3-key variant, should be pursued with some urgency.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
