统一价格机制设计用于动态代理的大群体
Uniform-Price Mechanism Design for a Large Population of Dynamic Agents
AI总结:
本文研究了多个时期内动态代理群体的协调问题,提出基于大群体游戏竞争均衡的机制,确保激励相容并在ε-纳什均衡中实现社会选择函数。
摘要:
本文聚焦于多个时期内具有私人信息的动态代理群体的协调问题。每个代理最大化个体效用,而协调者确定市场规则以实现群体目标。协调问题被 formulation 为动态机制设计问题。提出基于大群体游戏竞争均衡的机制。推导了在一般非线性动态系统下,所提机制激励相容并在ε-纳什均衡中实现社会选择函数的条件。此外,对于参数有界的线性二次问题,所提机制可在ε-主导策略均衡下最大化社会福利,受总资源约束。
英文摘要:
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group objectives. The coordination problem is formulated as a dynamic mechanism design problem. A mechanism is proposed based on the competitive equilibrium of the large population game. We derive the conditions for the general nonlinear dynamic systems under which the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible and can implement the social choice function in $ε$-Nash equilibrium. In addition, we show that for linear quadratic problems with bounded parameters, the proposed mechanism can maximize the social welfare subject to a total resource constraint in $ε$-dominant strategy equilibrium.
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