一种用于需求侧聚合的迭代在线机制
An Iterative On-Line Mechanism for Demand-Side Aggregation
AI总结:
本文提出一种用于大规模小负荷(如家庭和中小型企业)的需求侧聚合机制,通过阶梯时钟代理拍卖(SCPA)实现在线调度,通过两阶段拍卖设计实现高效能源使用调度。
摘要:
本文考虑了一种专门针对大量小负荷(如家庭和中小型企业)的需求侧聚合方案。我们引入了一种新的拍卖格式,称为阶梯时钟代理拍卖(SCPA),用于这些负载的在线调度。该格式分为两个阶段:一系列重叠的迭代递增价格时钟拍卖,每个时间槽对应一个有限决策时间范围内的拍卖;以及一组在每个单独时钟拍卖终止后开始的代理拍卖,确定每个时间槽的最终价格和分配。时钟阶段的重叠设计使投标人能够有效投标跨时期的电力使用 bundle,从而聚焦价格-数量空间中最相关部分。由于电力是可分割的商品,代理拍卖使用需求计划投标,聚合器利用这些投标计算每个时间槽的统一价格部分竞争均衡。我们证明,在投标人效用函数的温和假设下,代理阶段实现 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 结果,使代理阶段的简单投标成为贝叶斯-纳什均衡。此外,我们通过包含三种不同效用函数类型的家庭代理的场景展示了 SCPA,并展示了该机制如何实现高效的在线能源使用调度。
英文摘要:
This paper considers a demand-side aggregation scheme specifically for large numbers of small loads, such as households and small and medium-sized businesses. We introduce a novel auction format, called a staggered clock-proxy auction (SCPA), for on-line scheduling of these loads. This is a two phase format, consisting of: a sequence of overlapping iterative ascending-price clock auctions, one for each time-slot over a finite decision horizon, and; a set of proxy auctions that begin at the termination of each individual clock auction, and which determine the final price and allocation for each time-slot. The overlapping design of the clock phases grant bidders the ability to effectively bid on inter-temporal bundles of electricity use, thereby focusing on the most relevant parts of the price-quantity space. Since electricity is a divisible good, the proxy auction uses demand-schedule bids, which the aggregator uses to compute a uniform-price partial competitive equilibrium for each time slot. We show that, under mild assumptions on the bidders' utilities functions, the proxy phase implements the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome, which makes straightforward bidding in the proxy phase a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we demonstrate the SCPA in a scenario comprised of household agents with three different utility function types, and show how the mechanism enables efficient on-line energy use scheduling.
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