无遗憾的反应合成
Reactive Synthesis Without Regret
摘要：
无限持续时间的两个玩家零和游戏及其定量版本用于验证控制器（夏娃）和它的环境（亚当）之间的相互作用模型。通常要解决的问题是，夏娃是否有一个策略（和可计算性），可以最大化她对亚当的任何策略的回报。在这项工作中，我们感兴趣的策略，夏娃，最小化她的遗憾，即策略，最小化之间的差异，她的实际收益和她可能已经实现，如果她事先知道亚当的策略。我们给出算法来计算夏娃的策略，以确保最小的遗憾对对手的选择的战略是（一）不受限制，（二）限于位置的战略，或（三）限于字的战略。我们还建立了后者的版本和其他问题之间的关系，在文献中研究。
英文摘要：
Two-player zero-sum games of infinite duration and their quantitative versions are used in verification to model the interaction between a controller (Eve) and its environment (Adam). The question usually addressed is that of the existence (and computability) of a strategy for Eve that can maximize her payoff against any strategy of Adam. In this work, we are interested in strategies of Eve that minimize her regret, i.e. strategies that minimize the difference between her actual payoff and the payoff she could have achieved if she had known the strategy of Adam in advance. We give algorithms to compute the strategies of Eve that ensure minimal regret against an adversary whose choice of strategy is (i) unrestricted, (ii) limited to positional strategies, or (iii) limited to word strategies. We also establish relations between the latter version and other problems studied in the literature.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
