调整后的优胜者过程：特征和均衡
The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria
摘要：
调整赢家程序是Brams和Taylor提出的一种重要的公平分配机制。它已在实践中用于离婚协议和分析政治争端。假设真实的估值声明，它计算出一个无嫉妒、公平和帕累托最优的分配。我们表明，调整后的赢家承认了几个优雅的特征，这进一步阐明了与战略代理人达成的结果。我们发现，该程序可能不承认纯纳什均衡在离散或连续的变种，但保证有$ε$ -纳什均衡为每个$ε$ > 0。而且，在知情的平局打破下，精确的纯纳什均衡总是存在的，是帕累托最优的，并且它们的社会福利至少是最优的3/4。
英文摘要：
The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important fair division mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor for allocating goods between two parties. It has been used in practice for divorce settlements and analyzing political disputes. Assuming truthful declaration of the valuations, it computes an allocation that is envy-free, equitable and Pareto optimal. We show that Adjusted Winner admits several elegant characterizations, which further shed light on the outcomes reached with strategic agents. We find that the procedure may not admit pure Nash equilibria in either the discrete or continuous variants, but is guaranteed to have $ε$-Nash equilibria for each $ε$ > 0. Moreover, under informed tie-breaking, exact pure Nash equilibria always exist, are Pareto optimal, and their social welfare is at least 3/4 of the optimal.
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