arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1502.00353physics.soc-phcond-mat.stat-mechcs.SI
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复杂网络对基于模块的攻击的脆弱性

Complex networks vulnerability to module-based attacks

Bruno Requião da Cunha, Juan Carlos González-Avella, Sebastián Gonçalves

摘要:

在多学科领域的网络科学,优化的过程,有效地打破复杂的网络是吸引了很多注意力,从实践的角度来看。在这篇文章中,我们提出了一种基于模块的方法来有效地打破复杂的网络。该过程首先确定网络可以表示的社区,然后删除节点(边),连接不同的模块,其顺序在介数中心性排名列表。我们通过将其应用于社会,基础设施和生物网络的各种众所周知的例子来说明该方法。我们表明,所提出的方法总是优于顶点(边)攻击的基础上排名的节点(边)度或中心性,与一个巨大的收益的效率为一些例子。值得注意的是,对于美国电网,本方法将4941个节点的原始网络分解为许多小于197个节点(原始大小的4%)的片段,仅删除164个节点(约3%)。相比之下,任何基于度或中心性的过程,删除相同数量的节点,仅删除原始网络的22%,即超过3800个节点继续连接

英文摘要:

In the multidisciplinary field of Network Science, optimization of procedures for efficiently breaking complex networks is attracting much attention from practical points of view. In this contribution we present a module-based method to efficiently break complex networks. The procedure first identifies the communities in which the network can be represented, then it deletes the nodes (edges) that connect different modules by its order in the betweenness centrality ranking list. We illustrate the method by applying it to various well known examples of social, infrastructure, and biological networks. We show that the proposed method always outperforms vertex (edge) attacks which are based on the ranking of node (edge) degree or centrality, with a huge gain in efficiency for some examples. Remarkably, for the US power grid, the present method breaks the original network of 4941 nodes to many fragments smaller than 197 nodes (4% of the original size) by removing mere 164 nodes (~3%) identified by the procedure. By comparison, any degree or centrality based procedure, deleting the same amount of nodes, removes only 22% of the original network, i.e. more than 3800 nodes continue to be connected after that

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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