在等负荷再分配模型下电力系统的攻击脆弱性
Attack vulnerability of power systems under an equal load redistribution model
AI总结：
本文研究了对抗攻击对流网络的脆弱性，通过等负荷再分配模型确定最佳攻击线路以最小化稳态存活线路数，揭示系统最脆弱线路及最坏情况下的攻击脆弱性。
摘要：
本文研究了对抗攻击对流网络的脆弱性。考虑由N条输电线路组成的电力系统（或任何承载物理流的系统），初始负荷为L₁,…,L_N，容量为C₁,…,C_N。在等负荷再分配模型下，失败线路的负荷被均分给所有剩余线路。我们研究了寻找最佳k条线路进行攻击以最小化稳态存活线路数的优化问题，以此揭示系统的最坏情况攻击脆弱性及最脆弱线路。我们推导了几种特殊负荷-容量分布情况下的最优攻击策略。然后考虑一个修改的优化问题，其中攻击者还受到初始攻击集总负荷的限制（除了数量外），并证明该问题是NP难的。最后，我们为原问题和修改问题开发了启发式算法。通过广泛模拟，我们证明这些启发式算法在多种设置下均优于基准算法。
英文摘要：
This paper studies the vulnerability of flow networks against adversarial attacks. In particular, consider a power system (or, any system carrying a physical flow) consisting of $N$ transmission lines with initial loads $L_1, \ldots , L_N$ and capacities $C_1, \ldots, C_N$, respectively; the capacity $C_i$ defines the maximum flow allowed on line $i$. Under an equal load redistribution model, where load of failed lines is redistributed equally among all remaining lines, we study the {\em optimization} problem of finding the best $k$ lines to attack so as to minimize the number of {\em alive} lines at the steady-state (i.e., when cascades stop). This is done to reveal the worst-case attack vulnerability of the system as well as to reveal its most vulnerable lines. We derive optimal attack strategies in several special cases of load-capacity distributions that are practically relevant. We then consider a modified optimization problem where the adversary is also constrained by the {\em total} load (in addition to the number) of the initial attack set, and prove that this problem is NP-Hard. Finally, we develop heuristic algorithms for selecting the attack set for both the original and modified problems. Through extensive simulations, we show that these heuristics outperform benchmark algorithms under a wide range of settings.
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