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arXiv 1412.8518cs.GTcs.DS
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最佳平台设计

Optimal Platform Design

Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden

摘要:

拍卖行一般不可能为每个客户提供最佳的拍卖技术。相反,它提供一种或几种拍卖技术,客户选择最合适的一种。例如,eBay提供递增拍卖和“立即购买”定价。对每个客户来说,所提供的技术可能不是最佳的,但客户自己创造自己的技术成本太高。我们将这些强调通用性而不是最优性的机制称为平台机制。如果平台机制的性能超过客户的外部选项,则客户将采用平台机制,例如,(付费)聘请顾问设计最佳机制。我们问两个相关的问题。第一,外部选择的成本是多少?二是好的平台机制结构是什么?我们回答这些问题,使用一种新的无先验分析框架,在该框架中,我们寻求的机制,是近似最优的每一个先验。

英文摘要:

An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appropriate one. For example, eBay provides ascending auctions and "buy-it-now" pricing. For each client the offered technology may not be optimal, but it would be too costly for clients to create their own. We call these mechanisms, which emphasize generality rather than optimality, platform mechanisms. A platform mechanism will be adopted by a client if its performance exceeds that of the client's outside option, e.g., hiring (at a cost) a consultant to design the optimal mechanism. We ask two related questions. First, for what costs of the outside option will the platform be universally adopted? Second, what is the structure of good platform mechanisms? We answer these questions using a novel prior-free analysis framework in which we seek mechanisms that are approximately optimal for every prior.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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