反应战略:建立合作
Reactive Strategies: The Establishment of Cooperation
摘要:
合作通常表现为囚徒困境博弈。虽然个人的自我利益可能不赞成合作,合作可以发展,如果,例如,球员多次互动,调整自己的行为,相应地对对手的前一个行动。在种群动力学分析中,复制子方程被广泛应用于多种版本。虽然它通常是说,一个战略称为慷慨的针锋相对的反应策略集内的赢家,在这里,我们表明,这一结果取决于复制的版本和可用的策略的数量,源于这样一个事实,即一个动态系统也定义了可用的策略的数量,而不仅仅是由模型版本。使用计算机模拟和分析的论点,我们发现,慷慨的针锋相对的胜利,只有当可用的策略的数量不是太大,与背叛获胜,否则。
英文摘要:
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to opponent's previous action. To analyze population dynamics, replicator equation has been widely used under several versions. Although it is usually stated that a strategy called Generous-tit-for-tat is the winner within the reactive strategies set, here we show that this result depends on replicator's version and on the number of available strategies, stemming from the fact that a dynamics system is also defined by the number of available strategies and not only by the model version. Using computer simulations and analytical arguments, we show that Generous-tit-for-tat victory is found only if the number of strategies available is not too large, with defection winning otherwise.
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