通过空间相互作用的道德和双重道德标准的进化建立
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
摘要：
个人必须共同努力或分享稀缺资源的情况无处不在。然而，如果没有适当的机制来确保合作，最大化个人成功的进化压力往往会造成公地悲剧（如过度捕捞或破坏我们的环境）。这一贡献解决了一些与人类行为相关的难题，进化博弈论的方法，因为它已被成功地用于解释其他生物物种的行为多次，从细菌到脊椎动物。我们的代理人为基础的模型区分个人应用四种不同的行为策略：不合作的个人（“叛逃者”），合作的个人放弃惩罚的努力（称为“合作者”或“二阶搭便车”），合作者谁惩罚不合作的行为（“道德家”），和叛逃者，谁惩罚其他叛逃者，尽管不合作自己（“非道德家”）。通过考虑与邻近个体的空间相互作用，我们的模型揭示了几个有趣的效应：首先，道德家可以完全消除合作者。这种惩罚行为的传播需要行为策略的分离，并解决了“二阶搭便车问题”。第二，即使经过很长时间，系统行为也会显著改变其特征（“谁笑到最后，谁笑得最好”）。第三，大量叛逃者的存在可以在很大程度上加速道德主义者对不惩罚合作者的胜利。第四，为了成功，道德家可能以一种看起来像“邪恶的合作”的方式从非道德家那里获利。我们的研究结果表明，惩罚策略的考虑允许理解的建立和传播的“道德行为”的手段博弈论的概念。这表明，定量生物建模方法是强大的，即使在已经解决了非数学概念的领域。由于不同行为策略之间的进化竞争，某些社会行为的复杂动态变得可以理解。
英文摘要：
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ("defectors"), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called "cooperators" or "second-order free-riders"), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ("moralists"), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ("immoralists"). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the "second-order free-rider problem". Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ("who laughs last laughs best effect"). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Forth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an "unholy collaboration". Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows to understand the establishment and spreading of "moral behavior" by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors becomes understandable as result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
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