分布式服务系统中自私交互的静态和动态研究
Statics and dynamics of selfish interactions in distributed service systems
摘要:
我们研究了一类博弈模型的代理之间的竞争,以访问一些服务提供的分布式服务单元,并表现出拥塞和挫折的现象时,服务单元有有限的能力。我们提出了一种技术,基于统计物理学的空腔方法,来表征的纳什均衡的游戏的全谱。分析揭示了各种各样的均衡,具有非常不同的统计特性。自然的自私动态,如最佳反应,通常倾向于大效用均衡,即使那些较小效用的均衡数量呈指数增长。有趣的是,后者实际上可以通过选择接近服务单元容量饱和极限的最佳响应动态的初始条件来实现。我们还研究了一个更现实的随机变化的游戏通过一个简单而有效的近似的平均随机参数,平均情况下的纳什均衡的性质是定性的确定性的。
英文摘要:
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a technique, based on the cavity method of statistical physics, to characterize the full spectrum of Nash equilibria of the game. The analysis reveals a large variety of equilibria, with very different statistical properties. Natural selfish dynamics, such as best-response, usually tend to large-utility equilibria, even though those of smaller utility are exponentially more numerous. Interestingly, the latter actually can be reached by selecting the initial conditions of the best-response dynamics close to the saturation limit of the service unit capacities. We also study a more realistic stochastic variant of the game by means of a simple and effective approximation of the average over the random parameters, showing that the properties of the average-case Nash equilibria are qualitatively similar to the deterministic ones.
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