We propose a term structure power price model that, in contrast to widely accepted no-arbitrage based approaches, accounts for the non-storable nature of power. It belongs to a class of equilibrium game theoretic models with players divided into producers and consumers. The consumers' goal is to maximize a mean-variance utility function subject to satisfying an inelastic demand of their own clients (e.g households, businesses etc.) to whom they sell the power. The producers, who own a portfolio of power plants each defined by a running fuel (e.g. gas, coal, oil...) and physical characteristics (e.g. efficiency, capacity, ramp up/down times...), similarly, seek to maximize a mean-variance utility function consisting of power, fuel, and emission prices subject to production constraints. Our goal is to determine the term structure of the power price at which production matches consumption. In this paper we show that in such a setting the equilibrium price exists and also discuss the conditions for its uniqueness.
Walrasian Equilibrium and Centralized Distributed Optimization from the point of view of Modern Convex Optimization Methods on the Example of Resource Allocation Problem
Social optimum of finite mean field games: existence and uniqueness of equilibrium solutions in the finite horizon and stationary solutions in the infinite horizon
Decentralized Multi-product Pricing: Diagonal Dominance, Nash Equilibrium, and Price of Anarchy
Department of Information & Decision Sciences, College of Business Administration, University of Illinois Chicago(伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校商学院信息与决策科学系);Department of Industrial Engineering & Decision Analytics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科技大学工业工程与决策分析系);Department of Technology and Operations, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan(密歇根大学罗斯商学院技术与运营系)