无结构无线网络中的联合信道选择和功率控制：一种多人多臂Bandit框架
Joint Channel Selection and Power Control in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks: A Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit Framework
摘要：
研究动态无基础设施无线网络中的有效资源分配问题。假设无功干扰限制的情况下，每个发射机被允许选择一个频率信道（从一个共同的池）连同在每个传输试验的功率电平;因此，对于所有的发射机，不仅衰落增益，而且干扰传输的数量和它们的发射功率随时间而变化。由于没有中央控制器和时变网络特性，发射机获取全局信道和网络知识的效率非常低。因此，一个合理的假设是，发射机没有衰落增益，干扰和网络拓扑的知识。每个发送节点自私地旨在最大化其平均回报（或最小化其平均成本），这是该特定发送器的动作以及所有其他发送器的动作的函数。这种情况被建模为多人多臂对抗强盗游戏，其中多个玩家通过顺序拉动从已知的有限组手臂中选择的手臂来获得具有任意时变分布的先验未知奖励。由于玩家事先不知道平均奖励最高的手臂，他们试图尽量减少由玩家行为集决定的所谓遗憾，同时试图在某种意义上达到平衡。为此，本文设计了两种联合功率电平和信道选择策略。我们证明了我们的方法和基于最佳固定策略的平均回报之间的差距渐近收敛到零。此外，经验的联合频率的游戏收敛到一组相关的均衡。我们进一步描述这一套我们设计的游戏的两个特殊情况。
英文摘要：
This paper deals with the problem of efficient resource allocation in dynamic infrastructureless wireless networks. Assuming a reactive interference-limited scenario, each transmitter is allowed to select one frequency channel (from a common pool) together with a power level at each transmission trial; hence, for all transmitters, not only the fading gain, but also the number of interfering transmissions and their transmit powers are varying over time. Due to the absence of a central controller and time-varying network characteristics, it is highly inefficient for transmitters to acquire global channel and network knowledge. Therefore a reasonable assumption is that transmitters have no knowledge of fading gains, interference, and network topology. Each transmitting node selfishly aims at maximizing its average reward (or minimizing its average cost), which is a function of the action of that specific transmitter as well as those of all other transmitters. This scenario is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed adversarial bandit game, in which multiple players receive an a priori unknown reward with an arbitrarily time-varying distribution by sequentially pulling an arm, selected from a known and finite set of arms. Since players do not know the arm with the highest average reward in advance, they attempt to minimize their so-called regret, determined by the set of players' actions, while attempting to achieve equilibrium in some sense. To this end, we design in this paper two joint power level and channel selection strategies. We prove that the gap between the average reward achieved by our approaches and that based on the best fixed strategy converges to zero asymptotically. Moreover, the empirical joint frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated equilibria. We further characterize this set for two special cases of our designed game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
