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arXiv 1405.6058cs.CR
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基于虚拟化的安全性的有效性

On the effectiveness of virtualization-based security

Francesco Gadaleta, Raoul Strackx, Nick Nikiforakis, Frank Piessens, Wouter Joosen

摘要:

保护商用操作系统和应用程序免受恶意软件和有针对性的攻击已被证明是困难的。近年来,虚拟化受到了安全研究人员的关注,他们利用虚拟化来强化现有系统并提供强大的安全保证。这导致了有趣的用例,例如云计算,其中可能的敏感数据在远程第三方系统上处理。在远程服务器中迁移和处理数据提出了新的技术和法律问题,例如应该采取哪些安全措施来保护这些数据,或者如何证明代码的执行没有被篡改。在本文中,我们专注于技术方面。我们讨论的各种可能性的安全性在虚拟化层,我们使用作为一个案例研究\HelloRootkitty{},一个轻量级的不变性强制执行框架,它允许一个操作系统从内核级的攻击恢复。除了\HelloRootkitty{}之外,我们还探索使用特殊硬件芯片作为进一步保护和保证虚拟化系统完整性的一种方式。

英文摘要:

Protecting commodity operating systems and applications against malware and targeted attacks has proven to be difficult. In recent years, virtualization has received attention from security researchers who utilize it to harden existing systems and provide strong security guarantees. This has lead to interesting use cases such as cloud computing where possibly sensitive data is processed on remote, third party systems. The migration and processing of data in remote servers, poses new technical and legal questions, such as which security measures should be taken to protect this data or how can it be proven that execution of code wasn't tampered with. In this paper we focus on technological aspects. We discuss the various possibilities of security within the virtualization layer and we use as a case study \HelloRootkitty{}, a lightweight invariance-enforcing framework which allows an operating system to recover from kernel-level attacks. In addition to \HelloRootkitty{}, we also explore the use of special hardware chips as a way of further protecting and guaranteeing the integrity of a virtualized system.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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