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arXiv 1405.5860math.OCcs.GTcs.ITmath.ITmath.PR
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风险与信息价值的不对称性

Asymmetry of Risk and Value of Information

Roman V. Belavkin

摘要:

冯·诺依曼和摩根斯坦理论假定,不确定性下的理性选择等价于期望效用最大化。由于概率测度空间的仿射结构,这种观点在数学上是吸引人的和自然的。另一方面,行为经济学家和心理学家已经证明,人类总是违反欧盟的假设,从厌恶风险的行为转向冒险行为。这种悖论导致了决策描述理论的发展,例如著名的前景理论,它使用了一个$S$形的价值函数,带有凹凸分支,解释了观察到的不对称性。虽然这些理论成功地模拟了人类行为,但它们似乎与欧盟假设背后的自然公理相矛盾。在这里,我们表明,所观察到的行为的不对称性可以解释,如果除了效用的结果,理性的代理人也值随机事件所传达的信息。我们回顾了信息论的经典价值及其推广的主要思想。然后,我们证明了信息的价值是一个$S$形的函数,它的不对称性不依赖于如何定义的信息的概念,但只遵循线性的期望效用。因此,不像许多描述性的和“非预期”的效用理论,放弃了线性(即“独立”公理),我们制定了一个严格的论点,冯诺依曼和Morgenstern理性的代理人应该是风险厌恶和冒险,如果他们不是漠不关心的信息。

英文摘要:

The von Neumann and Morgenstern theory postulates that rational choice under uncertainty is equivalent to maximization of expected utility (EU). This view is mathematically appealing and natural because of the affine structure of the space of probability measures. Behavioural economists and psychologists, on the other hand, have demonstrated that humans consistently violate the EU postulate by switching from risk-averse to risk-taking behaviour. This paradox has led to the development of descriptive theories of decisions, such as the celebrated prospect theory, which uses an $S$-shaped value function with concave and convex branches explaining the observed asymmetry. Although successful in modelling human behaviour, these theories appear to contradict the natural set of axioms behind the EU postulate. Here we show that the observed asymmetry in behaviour can be explained if, apart from utilities of the outcomes, rational agents also value information communicated by random events. We review the main ideas of the classical value of information theory and its generalizations. Then we prove that the value of information is an $S$-shaped function, and that its asymmetry does not depend on how the concept of information is defined, but follows only from linearity of the expected utility. Thus, unlike many descriptive and `non-expected' utility theories that abandon the linearity (i.e. the `independence' axiom), we formulate a rigorous argument that the von Neumann and Morgenstern rational agents should be both risk-averse and risk-taking if they are not indifferent to information.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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