他在法兰西学院的演讲中,P.L. Lions引入了Master equation的概念,参见[5] Mean Field Games。它是在一个启发式的方式,从偏微分方程组偏微分方程组,相关的纳什均衡的一个大的,但有限的,玩家的数量。该方法,也解释了在[2],包括在一个正式的类比的条款。这个方程的有趣之处在于,它包含了一些有趣的特殊情况,可以直接研究,特别是当轨迹独立时,作为有限纳什均衡博弈的极限而得到的HJB-FP(Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman,Fokker-Planck)方程组,见[4]。通常,在平均域论中,人们可以通过引入代表性代理人的概念来绕过大的纳什均衡,其行为受到类似代理人的分布的影响,并且直接获得感兴趣的HJB-FP方程组,例如参见[1]。显然,对于主方程没有这样的方法。我们在这里证明这是可能的。我们首先对平均场类型的控制问题进行了研究,我们完全解释了主方程。对于平均场博弈本身,我们解决了一个相关的问题,并再次获得主方程。
英文摘要:
In his lectures at College de France, P.L. Lions introduced the concept of Master equation, see [5] for Mean Field Games. It is introduced in a heuristic fashion, from the system of partial differential equations, associated to a Nash equilibrium for a large, but finite, number of players. The method, also explained in[2], consists in a formal analogy of terms. The interest of this equation is that it contains interesting particular cases, which can be studied directly, in particular the system of HJB-FP (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman, Fokker-Planck) equations obtained as the limit of the finite Nash equilibrium game, when the trajectories are independent, see [4]. Usually, in mean field theory, one can bypass the large Nash equilibrium, by introducing the concept of representative agent, whose action is influenced by a distribution of similar agents, and obtains directly the system of HJB-FP equations of interest, see for instance [1]. Apparently, there is no such approach for the Master equation. We show here that it is possible. We first do it for the Mean Field type control problem, for which we interpret completely the Master equation. For the Mean Field Games itself, we solve a related problem, and obtain again the Master equation.