多人社会困境中的零决定性联盟
Zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social dilemmas
摘要:
直接互惠和有条件合作是防止社会困境中搭便车的重要机制。但在大群体中,这些机制可能变得无效,因为它们需要单个个体对同伴产生实质性影响。然而,最近在重复囚徒困境中发现的强有力的零决定性策略表明,我们可能低估了单个参与者可以施加的控制程度。在这里,我们开发了一个理论,零决定因素的策略,多人社会困境,与任何数量的参与者。我们区分了几个特别有趣的策略子类:公平策略确保自己的收益与群体的平均收益相匹配;勒索策略允许玩家的表现高于平均水平;慷慨策略让玩家的表现低于平均水平。我们用这个理论来探讨个人如何通过形成联盟来增强他们的战略选择。联盟的效果取决于联盟的规模、社会困境的类型以及联盟者的策略:公平的联盟减少了群体内的不平等;勒索的联盟胜过其他群体成员;但慷慨的联盟增加了福利。我们的研究结果突出了关键的相互作用,个人控制和联盟的形成,以取得成功的大集团。
英文摘要:
Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. But in large groups these mechanisms may become ineffective, because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of the powerful class of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that we may have underestimated the degree of control that a single player can exert. Here, we develop a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multiplayer social dilemmas, with any number of involved players. We distinguish several particularly interesting subclasses of strategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a player to perform above average; and generous strategies let a player perform below average. We use this theory to explore how individuals can enhance their strategic options by forming alliances. The effects of an alliance depend on the size of the alliance, the type of the social dilemma, and on the strategy of the allies: fair alliances reduce the inequality within their group; extortionate alliances outperform the remaining group members; but generous alliances increase welfare. Our results highlight the critical interplay of individual control and alliance formation to succeed in large groups.
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