通过多人反应策略制服总是背叛的突变体：非互惠与慷慨
Subduing always defecting mutants by multiplayer reactive strategies: Non-reciprocity versus generosity
摘要：
一个完全不慷慨和互惠的参与者群体可以创造一个强大的合作状态，如果参与者之间的互动重复足够长的时间，就不会被总是背叛的搭便车者所入侵。然而，严格的非慷慨和严格的互惠是理想的概念，有时甚至可能不可取。因此，在多大程度上可以允许慷慨或不互惠，而仍然不被变种人淹没，是一个自然的问题。在本文中，我们不仅要问这个问题，而且还要问在这种情况下，慷慨与非互惠相比如何。对于数学的具体性，我们的工作框架内的多人重复囚徒困境博弈反应策略在有限和无限的人口，并探讨上述问题，通过效益成本比的影响，互动组的大小，和人口规模。
英文摘要：
A completely non-generous and reciprocal population of players can create a robust cooperating state that cannot be invaded by always defecting free riders if the interactions among players are repeated for long enough. However, strict non-generosity and strict reciprocity are ideal concepts, and may not even be desirable sometimes. Therefore, to what extent generosity or non-reciprocity can be allowed while still not be swamped by the mutants, is a natural question. In this paper, we not only ask this question but furthermore ask how generosity comparatively fares against non-reciprocity in this context. For mathematical concreteness, we work within the framework of multiplayer repeated prisoner's dilemma game with reactive strategies in a finite and an infinite population; and explore the aforementioned questions through the effects of the benefit to cost ratio, the interaction group size, and the population size.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
