不完全最后通牒博弈中公平性的演化
Evolution of Fairness in the Not Quite Ultimatum Game
摘要：
最后通牒博弈（Ultimatum Game，UG）是一种经济博弈，两个参与者（提议者和响应者）决定如何分配一定数量的资金。基于理性决策的传统经济学理论预测，提议者应该提出最低限度的提议，回应者应该接受它，而人类受试者在UG中往往表现得更公平。以往的研究表明，额外的信息，如声誉，同理心，或空间结构是需要公平的发展在UG。在这里，我们表明，公平性可以在没有额外信息的情况下发展，如果玩家概率性地做出决定，并且在拒绝报价时可以继续互动，我们称之为不完全最后通牒博弈（NQUG）。NQUG的进化模拟表明，概率决策有助于提高提议者的出价水平以避免拒绝，而重复博弈则有利于应答者，因为他们可以等待好的出价。这些简单的扩展极大地促进了提议者的提议和响应者的接受阈值的公平性的演变。
英文摘要：
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is an economic game where two players (proposer and responder) decide how to split a certain amount of money. While traditional economic theories based on rational decision making predict that the proposer should make a minimal offer and the responder should accept it, human subjects tend to behave more fairly in UG. Previous studies suggested that extra information such as reputation, empathy, or spatial structure is needed for fairness to evolve in UG. Here we show that fairness can evolve without additional information if players make decisions probabilistically and may continue interactions when the offer is rejected, which we call the Not Quite Ultimatum Game (NQUG). Evolutionary simulations of NQUG showed that the probabilistic decision making contributes to the increase of proposers' offer amounts to avoid rejection, while the repetition of the game works to responders' advantage because they can wait until a good offer comes. These simple extensions greatly promote evolution of fairness in both proposers' offers and responders' acceptance thresholds.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
