典型银行系统中交易对手风险的系统性损失
Systemic Losses Due to Counter Party Risk in a Stylized Banking System
摘要:
我们报告了一个程式化的银行级联模型的研究,该模型使用负债和资产来定义银行的资产负债表,研究了由交易对手失败引起的系统性风险。在我们的程式化系统中,银行可以处于两种状态:正常经营或陷入困境,当银行的负债大于银行的资产时,银行的状态从正常经营变为陷入困境。这些银行通过银行间借贷网络联系在一起,只要一家银行陷入困境,其债权人就不能指望从陷入困境的银行获得贷款,这可能会使他们自己陷入困境。我们解决了一个均匀的系统分析和测试的鲁棒性和一般性的结果与模拟更复杂的系统的问题。我们研究的参数空间和相应的分布的经营银行映射的条件下,整个系统是稳定的或不稳定的。这使我们能够确定银行体系的金融稳定性如何受到监管决策(如杠杆率)的影响;我们讨论了央行行动(如量化宽松)的影响,并确定了使用资本重组拯救陷入困境的银行体系的成本。最后,我们估计了2007年和2012年英国和美国银行体系的稳定性,结果表明,2007年这两个银行体系更加不稳定,银行间市场的连通性部分导致了银行危机。
英文摘要:
We report a study of a stylized banking cascade model investigating systemic risk caused by counter party failure using liabilities and assets to define banks' balance sheet. In our stylized system, banks can be in two states: normally operating or distressed and the state of a bank changes from normally operating to distressed whenever its liabilities are larger than the banks' assets. The banks are connected through an interbank lending network and, whenever a bank is distressed, its creditor cannot expect the loan from the distressed bank to be repaid, potentially becoming distressed themselves. We solve the problem analytically for a homogeneous system and test the robustness and generality of the results with simulations of more complex systems. We investigate the parameter space and the corresponding distribution of operating banks mapping the conditions under which the whole system is stable or unstable. This allows us to determine how financial stability of a banking system is influenced by regulatory decisions, such as leverage; we discuss the effect of central bank actions, such as quantitative easing and we determine the cost of rescuing a distressed banking system using re-capitalisation. Finally, we estimate the stability of the UK and US banking systems in the years 2007 and 2012 showing that both banking systems were more unstable in 2007 and connectedness on the interbank market partly caused the banking crisis.
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