arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1402.3610cs.GTcs.MAcs.SYeess.SYmath.CO
收藏

潜在游戏是确保成本分摊游戏中纯纳什均衡的必要条件

Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games

California Institute of Technology(加州理工学院);University of Colorado, Boulder(科罗拉多大学博尔德分校)

Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason R. Marden, Adam Wierman

AI总结:

本文研究了设计成本分摊规则以确保纳什均衡的存在,证明了在特定可扩展和可分离游戏中,只有潜在游戏才能保证均衡存在。

摘要:

我们考虑了设计分配规则以在个体战略代理之间分配'福利'(成本或收入)的问题。已知有许多分配规则能保证该设置下存在(纯)纳什均衡,例如夏普利值及其加权变体;然而,对保证纳什均衡存在的分配规则空间的特征化尚不清楚。我们的工作为特定类别的可扩展和可分离游戏提供了该空间的精确特征化,包括设施选址、路由、网络形成和覆盖游戏等应用。给定任意局部福利函数W,我们证明了分配规则在所有游戏中保证均衡存在的充要条件是它等同于某种'基础'福利函数W'的广义加权夏普利值,W'可以不同于W。然而,如果要求预算平衡,那么W'必须与W相同。我们还以'广义'边际贡献的方式重新特征化了该空间,这在计算可行性方面更具吸引力。我们的结果的一个可能令人惊讶的后果是,为了保证在任何固定局部福利函数的所有游戏中存在均衡,必须在潜在游戏中工作。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this setting, e.g., the Shapley value and its weighted variants; however, a characterization of the space of distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium is unknown. Our work provides an exact characterization of this space for a specific class of scalable and separable games, which includes a variety of applications such as facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games. Given arbitrary local welfare functions W, we prove that a distribution rule guarantees equilibrium existence for all games (i.e., all possible sets of resources, agent action sets, etc.) if and only if it is equivalent to a generalized weighted Shapley value on some "ground" welfare functions W', which can be distinct from W. However, if budget-balance is required in addition to the existence of a Nash equilibrium, then W' must be the same as W. We also provide an alternate characterization of this space in terms of "generalized" marginal contributions, which is more appealing from the point of view of computational tractability. A possibly surprising consequence of our result is that, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence in all games with any fixed local welfare functions, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑