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arXiv 1308.3780cs.GTcs.AI
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资源有限代理人的决策理论

Decision Theory with Resource-Bounded Agents

Cornell University(康奈尔大学)

Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman

摘要:

在博弈论中,有两条主要的研究路线旨在捕捉资源有限的参与者。第一种是由鲁宾斯坦发起的,对代理进行昂贵的计算收费;第二种是由内曼发起的,不对计算收费,但限制了代理可以进行的计算,通常是通过将代理建模为有限自动机。我们回顾了最近的工作,在决策理论的背景下应用这两种方法。对于第一种方法,我们将决策问题中的选择对象视为图灵机,并向玩家收取所选图灵机的"复杂性“(例如,运行时间)。这种方法可以用来解释众所周知的现象,如第一印象偏差(即,人们倾向于更重视他们早期听到的证据)和信仰极化(两个先前信仰不同的人,听到同样的证据,最终可能得出截然相反的结论)作为相当理性的决定的结果。对于第二种方法,我们将人建模为有限自动机,并提供了一个简单的算法,该算法在捕获许多感兴趣的设置的问题上,可证明随着自动机中状态数量的增加而表现最佳。

英文摘要:

There have been two major lines of research aimed at capturing resource-bounded players in game theory. The first, initiated by Rubinstein, charges an agent for doing costly computation; the second, initiated by Neyman, does not charge for computation, but limits the computation that agents can do, typically by modeling agents as finite automata. We review recent work on applying both approaches in the context of decision theory. For the first approach, we take the objects of choice in a decision problem to be Turing machines, and charge players for the ``complexity'' of the Turing machine chosen (e.g., its running time). This approach can be used to explain well-known phenomena like first-impression-matters biases (i.e., people tend to put more weight on evidence they hear early on) and belief polarization (two people with different prior beliefs, hearing the same evidence, can end up with diametrically opposed conclusions) as the outcomes of quite rational decisions. For the second approach, we model people as finite automata, and provide a simple algorithm that, on a problem that captures a number of settings of interest, provably performs optimally as the number of states in the automaton increases.

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