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arXiv 1307.3435cs.AI
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论尼柯德条件、归纳法则和乌鸦悖论

On Nicod's Condition, Rules of Induction and the Raven Paradox

Research School of Computer Science(计算机科学研究学院);Australian National University(澳大利亚国立大学)

Hadi Mohasel Afshar, Peter Sunehag

摘要:

写乌鸦悖论的哲学家们经常指出,在给定一些背景信息的情况下,尼柯德条件(NC)成立,而不适用于其他情况,但很少进一步。也就是说,通常不会探索哪些背景信息使NC为真或假。本文件旨在填补这一空白。对我们来说,"(客观的)背景知识"仅限于可以表示为概率事件的信息。任何其他配置都被认为是主观的,并且是先验概率分布的属性。我们在两个特定的环境中研究NC。在第一种情况下,一些个体的完整描述是已知的,例如,人们知道一组个体中的每一个个体是否是黑色的,是否是乌鸦。在第二种情况下,给出了具有特定属性的个体的数量,例如,人们知道有多少乌鸦或有多少黑色的东西(在相关的人口中)。虽然这个悖论的一些最著名的答案是依赖于测量的,但我们的讨论并不局限于任何特定的概率测量。我们最有趣的结果是,在第二种情况下,NC违反了一种简单的归纳推理(即可投射性)。由于相对于NC,后一规则与我们的归纳推理的直觉概念更密切相关,并且更直接地被我们的归纳推理的直觉概念所证明,因此这种张力使NC的可解释性成为一个反对的理由。最后,我们建议,NC的非正式表示似乎是直观上合理的,因为它很容易被误认为是类比推理。

英文摘要:

Philosophers writing about the ravens paradox often note that Nicod's Condition (NC) holds given some set of background information, and fails to hold against others, but rarely go any further. That is, it is usually not explored which background information makes NC true or false. The present paper aims to fill this gap. For us, "(objective) background knowledge" is restricted to information that can be expressed as probability events. Any other configuration is regarded as being subjective and a property of the a priori probability distribution. We study NC in two specific settings. In the first case, a complete description of some individuals is known, e.g. one knows of each of a group of individuals whether they are black and whether they are ravens. In the second case, the number of individuals having a particular property is given, e.g. one knows how many ravens or how many black things there are (in the relevant population). While some of the most famous answers to the paradox are measure-dependent, our discussion is not restricted to any particular probability measure. Our most interesting result is that in the second setting, NC violates a simple kind of inductive inference (namely projectability). Since relative to NC, this latter rule is more closely related to, and more directly justified by our intuitive notion of inductive reasoning, this tension makes a case against the plausibility of NC. In the end, we suggest that the informal representation of NC may seem to be intuitively plausible because it can easily be mistaken for reasoning by analogy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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