In this paper, we derive team and person-by-person optimality conditions for distributed differential decision systems with different or decentralized information structures. The necessary conditions of optimality are given in terms of Hamiltonian system of equations consisting of a coupled backward and forward differential equations and a Hamiltonian projected onto the subspace generated by the decentralized information structures. Under certain global convexity conditions it is shown that the optimality conitions are also sufficient.
Optimality of Symmetric Independent Policies under Decentralized Mean-Field Information Sharing for Stochastic Teams and Equivalence with McKean-Vlasov Control of a Representative Agent
Royal Military College of Canada(加拿大皇家军事学院);Bilkent University(比尔肯特大学);Queen’s University(女王大学)
Mean field social optimization: feedback person-by-person optimality and the dynamic programming equation
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Carleton University(卡尔顿大学数学与统计学院);GERAD;Department of Mathematics, National Central University(中央大学数学系);Department of Mathematical Sciences, National Chengchi University(国立政治大学数学科学系);Institute of Statistics, National Central University(中央大学统计研究所)
Isomorphism Properties of Optimality and Equilibrium Solutions under Equivalent Information Structure Transformations: Stochastic Dynamic Games and Teams
Dynamic Team Theory of Stochastic Differential Decision Systems with Decentralized Noiseless Feedback Information Structures via Girsanov's Measure Transformation
Centralized Versus Decentralized Team Games of Distributed Stochastic Differential Decision Systems with Noiseless Information Structures-Part I: General Theory
Mean-Field Systems with Heterogeneous Subteams: Optimality of Cluster-Symmetric Independent Policies and Equivalence with Decentralized McKean-Vlasov Control of Cluster-Representative Agents
Queen’s University(女王大学);Royal Military College of Canada(加拿大皇家军事学院);Bilkent University(比尔肯特大学)