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arXiv 1305.0967math.OCcs.GTmath.DS
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惯性博弈动力学及其在约束optimization中的应用

Inertial game dynamics and applications to constrained optimization

Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos

摘要:

为了提供一类新的博弈动力学具有良好的长期理性属性,我们推导出一个二阶惯性系统,建立在广泛研究的“重球摩擦”最优化方法。通过利用一个众所周知的链接之间的复制动力学和Shahshahani几何空间上的混合策略,动态表示在黎曼几何框架中的轨迹被加速的球员的单边收益梯度和他们放慢纳什均衡附近。令人惊讶的是(与复制子动力学的另一个二阶变体形成鲜明对比),惯性复制子动力学不是适定的;另一方面,通过赋予混合策略空间不同的Hessian-Riemann(HR)度量结构,可以获得适定的系统,并且我们描述了这样做的HR几何。在单智能体版本的动态(对应于约束优化的单纯形一样的对象),我们表明,经常的极大点的光滑函数吸引所有附近的解决方案轨道具有较低的初始速度。更一般地说,我们建立了一个惯性变量的所谓的“民间定理”的进化对策论,我们表明,严格的平衡吸引在非对称(多人口)的游戏-当然,提供的动态是适定的。一个类似的渐近稳定性结果得到了对称(单种群)游戏中的进化稳定策略。

英文摘要:

Aiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term rationality properties, we derive a second-order inertial system that builds on the widely studied "heavy ball with friction" optimization method. By exploiting a well-known link between the replicator dynamics and the Shahshahani geometry on the space of mixed strategies, the dynamics are stated in a Riemannian geometric framework where trajectories are accelerated by the players' unilateral payoff gradients and they slow down near Nash equilibria. Surprisingly (and in stark contrast to another second-order variant of the replicator dynamics), the inertial replicator dynamics are not well-posed; on the other hand, it is possible to obtain a well-posed system by endowing the mixed strategy space with a different Hessian-Riemannian (HR) metric structure, and we characterize those HR geometries that do so. In the single-agent version of the dynamics (corresponding to constrained optimization over simplex-like objects), we show that regular maximum points of smooth functions attract all nearby solution orbits with low initial speed. More generally, we establish an inertial variant of the so-called "folk theorem" of evolutionary game theory and we show that strict equilibria are attracting in asymmetric (multi-population) games - provided of course that the dynamics are well-posed. A similar asymptotic stability result is obtained for evolutionarily stable strategies in symmetric (single- population) games.

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