成本回收贝叶斯优化机制设计
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
摘要:
本文研究了单参数域中贝叶斯激励相容机制的设计问题,其目标是优化以社会成本衡量的社会效率。在我们考虑的问题中,一组参与者竞争从一个可以提供这种服务的机制中获得服务。该机制希望选择为哪些代理人服务以实现社会效率最大化,但又不愿意承受预期损失:代理人的报酬应覆盖预期服务成本。我们开发了一个通用的方法转换为贝叶斯激励兼容机制,是成本回收的期望的基本优化问题的任意近似算法。特别是,我们给出了多项式时间的黑箱减少从机制设计问题的社会成本最小化算法的设计没有激励约束的问题。我们的减少将给定算法的预期社会成本增加了O(log(min{n,h}))的因子,其中n是代理的数量,h是支持中最高和最低非零估值之间的比率。我们还提供了一个下限,说明这种社会成本的膨胀是必不可少的:没有BIC成本回收机制可以实现比Ω(log(n))或Ω(log(h))更好的近似因子。我们的技术扩展到表明,某一类真实的算法可以在非贝叶斯设置成本回收,在这样一种方式,近似因子退化最多O(log(min{n,h}))。这是对具有膨胀因子O(log n)的先前已知构造的改进。
英文摘要:
We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the problems we consider, a group of participants compete to receive service from a mechanism that can provide such services at a cost. The mechanism wishes to choose which agents to serve in order to maximize social efficiency, but is not willing to suffer an expected loss: the agents' payments should cover the cost of service in expectation. We develop a general method for converting arbitrary approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problem into Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms that are cost-recovering in expectation. In particular, we give polynomial time black-box reductions from the mechanism design problem to the problem of designing a social cost minimization algorithm without incentive constraints. Our reduction increases the expected social cost of the given algorithm by a factor of O(log(min{n, h})), where n is the number of agents and h is the ratio between the highest and lowest nonzero valuations in the support. We also provide a lower bound illustrating that this inflation of the social cost is essential: no BIC cost-recovering mechanism can achieve an approximation factor better than Ω(log(n)) or Ω(log(h)) in general. Our techniques extend to show that a certain class of truthful algorithms can be made cost-recovering in the non-Bayesian setting, in such a way that the approximation factor degrades by at most O(log(min{n, h})). This is an improvement over previously-known constructions with inflation factor O(log n).
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