查询激励网络中的Sybil证明机制
Sybil-proof Mechanisms in Query Incentive Networks
摘要:
在本文中,我们研究的激励机制,从网络代理检索信息。根据[Kleinberg and Raghavan 2005]中的模型,代理被表示为无限树中的节点,该无限树由随机分支过程生成。查询由根发出,并且每个节点拥有具有独立概率$p=1/n$的答案。此外,树中的每个节点都采取策略性行动以最大化其自身的回报。为了鼓励代理参与信息获取过程,需要一种激励机制来奖励提供信息的代理以及帮助促进这种获取的代理。我们专注于设计有效的防欺诈激励机制,即,其对于假身份攻击是鲁棒的。%我们考虑的激励机制是防欺诈的,即,鲁棒的假身份攻击。我们提出了一个家庭的机制,称为直接转介(DR)机制,分配最大的奖励信息持有人以及它的直接父母(或直接转介)。我们发现,如果设计得当,直接转诊机制是防梅毒和有效的。特别是,我们表明,对于任何分支因子$b>1$,我们可以实现将查询向下传播到$h$级别的预期$O(h^2)$成本。当需要找到具有高概率的答案时,这个结果以指数方式改进了以前的工作。当底层网络是一个确定性链时,我们的机制在一些温和的假设下是最优的。此外,由于其简单的奖励结构,DR机制可能有很好的机会在实践中被采用。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we study incentive mechanisms for retrieving information from networked agents. Following the model in [Kleinberg and Raghavan 2005], the agents are represented as nodes in an infinite tree, which is generated by a random branching process. A query is issued by the root, and each node possesses an answer with an independent probability $p=1/n$. Further, each node in the tree acts strategically to maximize its own payoff. In order to encourage the agents to participate in the information acquisition process, an incentive mechanism is needed to reward agents who provide the information as well as agents who help to facilitate such acquisition. We focus on designing efficient sybil-proof incentive mechanisms, i.e., which are robust to fake identity attacks. %We consider incentive mechanisms which are sybil-proof, i.e., robust to fake identity attacks. We propose a family of mechanisms, called the direct referral (DR) mechanisms, which allocate most reward to the information holder as well as its direct parent (or direct referral). We show that, when designed properly, the direct referral mechanism is sybil-proof and efficient. In particular, we show that we may achieve an expected cost of $O(h^2)$ for propagating the query down $h$ levels for any branching factor $b>1$. This result exponentially improves on previous work when requiring to find an answer with high probability. When the underlying network is a deterministic chain, our mechanism is optimal under some mild assumptions. In addition, due to its simple reward structure, the DR mechanism might have good chance to be adopted in practice.
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