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arXiv 1301.1935math.OC
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控制者更知情的重复对策一致值的存在性

Existence of the uniform value in repeated games with a more informed controller

Fabien Gensbittel, Miquel Oliu-Barton, Xavier Venel

摘要:

我们证明了在一个一般的零和重复博弈中,第一个玩家比第二个玩家更知情,并控制着状态信息的演化,存在一致值。这一结果扩展了先前关于部分观察的马尔可夫决策过程(Rosenberg,Solan,Vieille 2002)和具有知情控制器的重复博弈(Renault 2012)的结果。我们对更知情的参与者的正式定义比包含信号更一般,因此允许对行动的不完善监控。我们构造了一个辅助随机对策,其状态空间是参与人2的二阶信念(参与人1对初始博弈的真实状态变量的信念)的集合,并利用Renault 2012的一个结果证明了它有一个值.在这项工作中的一个关键因素是证明,玩家1可以使用的辅助游戏在我们的一般框架中的初始游戏的策略,这使得推导出的辅助游戏的值也是我们的初始重复游戏的值,通过使用经典的参数。

英文摘要:

We prove that in a general zero-sum repeated game where the first player is more informed than the second player and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists. This result extends previous results on Markov decision processes with partial observation (Rosenberg, Solan, Vieille 2002), and repeated games with an informed controller (Renault 2012). Our formal definition of a more informed player is more general than the inclusion of signals, allowing therefore for imperfect monitoring of actions. We construct an auxiliary stochastic game whose state space is the set of second order beliefs of player 2 (beliefs about beliefs of player 1 on the true state variable of the initial game) with perfect monitoring and we prove it has a value by using a result of Renault 2012. A key element in this work is to prove that player 1 can use strategies of the auxiliary game in the initial game in our general framework, which allows to deduce that the value of the auxiliary game is also the value of our initial repeated game by using classical arguments.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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