具有知情控制者的重复博弈的价值
The value of Repeated Games with an informed controller
摘要：
我们考虑零和重复博弈（或带信号的随机对策）的一般模型，并假设其中一个参与者完全知情，并控制状态变量的转换。我们证明了一致值的存在性，推广了文献中的一些结果。对一类具有纯策略的随机对策，得到了其存在性的初步结果。
英文摘要：
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform value, generalizing several results of the literature. A preliminary existence result is obtained for a certain class of stochastic games played with pure strategies.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
