具有执行不确定性的机制设计
Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty
摘要:
我们引入了容错机制设计的概念,它扩展了标准的博弈论框架的机制设计,允许执行的不确定性。具体来说,我们定义的任务分配问题,其中的代理的私人信息不仅是他们的成本,尝试的任务,但也失败的概率。对于这种设置的几个不同的情况下,我们提出的技术成果,包括积极的形式的机制,是激励兼容,个别合理和有效的,和消极的形式的不可能性定理。
英文摘要:
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems.
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