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arXiv 1208.1676cs.GTcs.MA
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基于众包的时间关键和成本关键任务执行的机制设计

Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing

Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Zou

摘要:

众包的一个令人兴奋的应用是在复杂的任务执行中使用社交网络。在本文中,我们解决的问题,规划师谁需要激励代理网络内,以寻求他们的帮助,在执行{ \em原子任务},以及在招募其他代理执行任务。我们研究这个机制设计问题下的两个自然资源优化设置:(1)成本关键的任务,规划者的目标是最小化总成本,和(2)时间关键的任务,目标是最小化总时间之前,任务被执行。我们确定了一组理想的属性,应该满足众包机制。特别地,{ \em防传}和{ \em防传}是我们所需的两个互补性质。我们证明了没有一种机制可以同时满足所有期望的性质。这自然地引导我们去探索临界性质的近似形式。我们专注于我们的注意力近似sybil-proofness和我们的探索导致一个参数化的家庭支付机制,满足防欺诈。我们刻画了在成本关键和时间关键域的理想属性的近似版本。

英文摘要:

An exciting application of crowdsourcing is to use social networks in complex task execution. In this paper, we address the problem of a planner who needs to incentivize agents within a network in order to seek their help in executing an {\em atomic task} as well as in recruiting other agents to execute the task. We study this mechanism design problem under two natural resource optimization settings: (1) cost critical tasks, where the planner's goal is to minimize the total cost, and (2) time critical tasks, where the goal is to minimize the total time elapsed before the task is executed. We identify a set of desirable properties that should ideally be satisfied by a crowdsourcing mechanism. In particular, {\em sybil-proofness} and {\em collapse-proofness} are two complementary properties in our desiderata. We prove that no mechanism can satisfy all the desirable properties simultaneously. This leads us naturally to explore approximate versions of the critical properties. We focus our attention on approximate sybil-proofness and our exploration leads to a parametrized family of payment mechanisms which satisfy collapse-proofness. We characterize the approximate versions of the desirable properties in cost critical and time critical domain.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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