arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1404.2399cs.GT
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节俭的在线激励机制为众包任务如实

Frugal Online Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Tasks Truthfully

Dong Zhao, Huadong Ma, Liang Liu

摘要:

移动人群感知(MCS)是一种新的模式,它利用无处不在的智能手机来有效地收集数据,从而实现许多新颖的应用。为了实现良好的服务质量的MCS应用,激励机制是必要的,以吸引更多的用户参与。大多数现有的机制只适用于离线的情况下,所有用户的信息是已知的先验。相反,我们关注的是一个更现实的场景,用户以随机顺序一个接一个地在线。基于在线拍卖模型,研究了用户在到达时向众包者提交个人信息的问题,众包者的目标是在指定的截止日期之前选择一部分用户,使总支付最小,同时完成指定数量的任务,设计了三种在线机制:Homo-OMZ,Hetero-OMZ和Hetero-OMG,它们都能满足计算效率,个人理性、成本真实性和消费者主权。Homo-OMZ机制适用于同质用户模型,能够满足社会效率但不满足恒节俭。Hetero-OMZ和Hetero-OMG机制适用于同构和异构用户模型,并能满足恒定的节俭性。此外,Hetero-OMG机制还可以满足时间真实性。通过大量的模拟,我们评估的性能和验证我们的在线机制的理论属性。

英文摘要:

Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm which takes advantage of pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve good service quality for a MCS application, incentive mechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation. Most of existing mechanisms apply only for the offline scenario where all users' information are known a priori. On the contrary, we focus on a more realistic scenario where users arrive one by one online in a random order. Based on the online auction model, we investigate the problem that users submit their private profiles to the crowdsourcer when they arrive, and the crowdsourcer aims at selecting a subset of users before a specified deadline for minimizing the total payment while a specific number of tasks can be completed.We design three online mechanisms, Homo-OMZ, Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG, all of which can satisfy the computational efficiency, individual rationality, cost-truthfulness, and consumer sovereignty. The Homo-OMZ mechanism is applicable to the homogeneous user model and can satisfy the social efficiency but not constant frugality. The Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG mechanisms are applicable to both the homogeneous and heterogeneous user models, and can satisfy the constant frugality. Besides, the Hetero-OMG mechanism can also satisfy the time-truthfulness. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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