伊朗的隐藏互联网:国家网络上的私有地址分配
The Hidden Internet of Iran: Private Address Allocations on a National Network
摘要:
虽然各供资机构向服务的开发商和供应商提供了大量支助,以便利信息通过因特网不受限制地流动,但对伊朗伊斯兰共和国的基本通信网络基础设施缺乏综合了解。在缺乏开放获取和公共数据的情况下,谣言和恐惧占据了主导地位。在对该国审查制度的初步研究中,我们发现初步迹象表明,伊朗的电信实体允许私人地址在国内路由,无论是有意还是无意,都创建了一个只能在国内访问的隐藏网络。此外,诸如DNS条目的记录提供了“双栈”方法的证据,其中除了全球IP地址之外,服务器还被分配了国内IP地址。尽管我们提出的主张具有明显的政治含义,特别是鉴于对“第五个五年发展计划”第46条建立“国家信息网络”的任务的广泛猜测,我们避免假设这个结构的目的。为了征求对未来研究的关键反馈,我们概述了我们的初步研究结果,并试图证明,争论中的问题是一个全国性的现象,值得更广泛的关注。
英文摘要:
While funding agencies have provided substantial support for the developers and vendors of services that facilitate the unfettered flow of information through the Internet, little consolidated knowledge exists on the basic communications network infrastructure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the absence open access and public data, rumors and fear have reigned supreme. During provisional research on the country's censorship regime, we found initial indicators that telecommunications entities in Iran allowed private addresses to route domestically, whether intentionally or unintentionally, creating a hidden network only reachable within the country. Moreover, records such as DNS entries lend evidence of a 'dual stack' approach, wherein servers are assigned a domestic IP addresses, in addition to a global one. Despite the clear political implications of the claim we put forward, particularly in light of rampant speculation regarding the mandate of Article 46 of the 'Fifth Five Year Development Plan' to establish a "national information network," we refrain from hypothesizing the purpose of this structure. In order to solicit critical feedback for future research, we outline our initial findings and attempt to demonstrate that the matter under contention is a nation-wide phenomenom that warrants broader attention.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。