民族-国家路由：审查、窃听和BGP
Nation-State Routing: Censorship, Wiretapping, and BGP
摘要：
互联网流量的处理越来越受到国家政策的影响，这些政策要求一国的互联网服务提供商采用共同的协议或做法。例子包括政府强制审查、窃听以及IPv6和DNSSEC的协议部署授权。如果整个国家的ISP都对互联网流量采用共同的政策，那么全球的影响可能是巨大的。例如，有多少国家依赖中国或英国（众所周知的流量审查）来转运他们的流量？这类问题令人惊讶地难以回答，因为它们需要结合在前缀、自治系统和国家级别收集的信息，并努力解决有关AS级拓扑和路由策略的不完整知识。在本文中，我们开发的第一个框架，国家一级的路由分析，这使我们能够回答有关每个国家的影响，国际交通流量的问题。我们的研究结果表明，一些国家知道他们的国家政策，如伊朗和中国，有相对较小的影响域间路由，而三个国家（美国，英国和德国）是中央的国际可达性，因此，他们的政策有巨大的潜在影响。
英文摘要：
The treatment of Internet traffic is increasingly affected by national policies that require the ISPs in a country to adopt common protocols or practices. Examples include government enforced censorship, wiretapping, and protocol deployment mandates for IPv6 and DNSSEC. If an entire nation's worth of ISPs apply common policies to Internet traffic, the global implications could be significant. For instance, how many countries rely on China or Great Britain (known traffic censors) to transit their traffic? These kinds of questions are surprisingly difficult to answer, as they require combining information collected at the prefix, Autonomous System, and country level, and grappling with incomplete knowledge about the AS-level topology and routing policies. In this paper we develop the first framework for country-level routing analysis, which allows us to answer questions about the influence of each country on the flow of international traffic. Our results show that some countries known for their national policies, such as Iran and China, have relatively little effect on interdomain routing, while three countries (the United States, Great Britain, and Germany) are central to international reachability, and their policies thus have huge potential impact.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
