空间公共物品博弈中的愿望诱导重联
Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public goods game
摘要:
在这封信中,我们引入了一个愿望诱导的重新连接机制的空间公共产品的游戏。如果一个参与者从以邻居为中心的群体中获得的收益不超过愿望水平,他将重新连接到随机选择的参与者。我们发现,中等期望水平最能促进合作。这一最优现象可以用负反馈效应来解释,即中间期望水平诱导的中等水平的重连可以改变合作者的失败,从而促进合作的快速传播。而低、高抽吸水平引起的重连不足和过度重连均不利于这种效应。此外,我们发现,中间愿望水平可以导致程度的异质性分布,这将有利于合作的演化。
英文摘要:
In this Letter, we introduce an aspiration-induced reconnection mechanism into the spatial public goods game. A player will reconnect to a randomly chosen player if its payoff acquired from the group centered on the neighbor does not exceed the aspiration level. We find that an intermediate aspiration level can best promote cooperation. This optimal phenomenon can be explained by a negative feedback effect, namely, a moderate level of reconnection induced by the intermediate aspiration level induces can change the downfall of cooperators, and then facilitate the fast spreading of cooperation. While insufficient reconnection and excessive reconnection induced by low and high aspiration levels respectively are not conductive to such an effect. Moreover, we find that the intermediate aspiration level can lead to the heterogeneous distribution of degree, which will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation.
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