可再生能源一体化随机资源的机制设计
Mechanism Designs for Stochastic Resources for Renewable Energy Integration
摘要:
在将可再生能源整合到现有电网中的许多挑战中,有一个挑战是将可再生能源发电机整合到电力系统经济中。电力市场目前的运作方式是,参与的发电商必须提供合同规定的数量。然而,风力发电机等可再生能源发电机无法确定地提供合同金额。因此,必须考虑替代市场架构,其中有聚合实体通过从可再生能源发电机购买电力参与电力市场,并承担合同金额的任何短缺风险。在本文中,我们提出了拍卖机制,可用于采购随机资源的聚合器,如风力发电。随机资源的性质不同于经典资源,因为这种资源只能随机可用。生成的分布是私人信息,系统的目标是真实地获取这些信息。我们引入一个变种的VCG机制,这个问题。我们还提出了一个非VCG机制与合同支付加罚款的支付结构。我们以各种方式概括基本机制。然后,我们考虑设置有两个类的球员,以证明在这种情况下的拍卖设计的难度。我们还考虑了一种替代架构,其中发电商需要通过从现货市场购买来满足合同金额的任何短缺。
英文摘要:
Among the many challenges of integrating renewable energy sources into the existing power grid, is the challenge of integrating renewable energy generators into the power systems economy. Electricity markets currently are run in a way that participating generators must supply contracted amounts. And yet, renewable energy generators such as wind power generators cannot supply contracted amounts with certainty. Thus, alternative market architectures must be considered where there are aggregator entities who participate in the electricity market by buying power from the renewable energy generators, and assuming risk of any shortfall from contracted amounts. In this paper, we propose auction mechanisms that can be used by the aggregators for procuring stochastic resources, such as wind power. The nature of stochastic resources is different from classical resources in that such a resource is only available stochastically. The distribution of the generation is private information, and the system objective is to truthfully elicit such information. We introduce a variant of the VCG mechanism for this problem. We also propose a non-VCG mechanism with a contracted-payment-plus-penalty payoff structure. We generalize the basic mechanisms in various ways. We then consider the setting where there are two classes of players to demonstrate the difficulty of auction design in such scenarios. We also consider an alternative architecture where the generators need to fulfill any shortfall from the contracted amount by buying from the spot market.
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