通过非合作资源调度博弈评估可再生能源社区内本地生产的电力价值
Valuing the Electricity Produced Locally in Renewable Energy Communities through Noncooperative Resources Scheduling Games
AI总结：
针对可再生能源社区日前调度，提出合作式需求侧管理与允许多余发电估值的两种市场设计，均建模为集中优化与非合作博弈，证明均衡存在性并给出分布式算法，在55成员用例上验证了其降低成本和提升自耗率等优势。
摘要：
我们提出了两种市场设计，用于可再生能源社区内能源交换的日前最优调度。第一种设计在社区内实施合作式需求侧管理方案，其中成员的目标通过电网电价相互耦合；而第二种设计还允许对社区内及零售市场上的多余发电进行估值。两种设计首先被表述为集中式优化问题，然后表述为非合作博弈。在后一种情况下，相应（广义）纳什均衡的存在性和效率得到了严格研究和证明，并提出了用于求解这些均衡的迭代算法的分布式实现，且给出了收敛性证明。模型在一个由55个成员组成的用例上进行了测试，这些成员拥有光伏发电、储能和灵活电器，并与成员单独行动（无社区情况）的基准情形进行了比较。我们计算了全球可再生能源社区成本和个体账单、分散模型相对于集中式最优的低效性，以及诸如自耗率、自给率和峰均比等技术指标。
英文摘要：
We propose two market designs for the optimal day-ahead scheduling of energy exchanges within renewable energy communities. The first one implements a cooperative demand side management scheme inside a community where members objectives are coupled through grid tariffs, whereas the second allows in addition the valuation of excess generation in the community and on the retail market. Both designs are formulated as centralized optimization problems first, and as non cooperative games then. In the latter case, the existence and efficiency of the corresponding (Generalized) Nash Equilibria are rigorously studied and proven, and distributed implementations of iterative solution algorithms for finding these equilibria are proposed, with proofs of convergence. The models are tested on a use-case made by 55 members with PV generation, storage and flexible appliances, and compared with a benchmark situation where members act individually (situation without community). We compute the global REC costs and individual bills, inefficiencies of the decentralized models compared to the centralized optima, as well as technical indices such as self-consumption ratio, self-sufficiency ratio, and peak-to-average ratio.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
