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arXiv 1205.4564cs.NIcs.GT
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BGP和S-BGP下流量劫持的计算复杂性

Computational Complexity of Traffic Hijacking under BGP and S-BGP

Marco Chiesa, Giuseppe Di Battista, Thomas Erlebach, Maurizio Patrignani

摘要:

有害的Internet劫持事件表明,用于自治系统(AS)之间交换路由信息的边界网关协议(BGP)是多么脆弱。正如最近的研究成果所证明的那样,即使是正在部署的BGP的安全变体S-BGP也不能完全阻止流量吸引攻击。给定两个AS之间的流量,我们研究了恶意AS设计劫持或拦截该流量的策略是多么困难。我们发现,这个问题标志着BGP和S-BGP之间的巨大差异。也就是说,虽然它是可解决的,在合理的假设下,在多项式时间的类型的攻击,通常在BGP中执行,它是NP难的S-BGP。我们的研究有几个副产品。例如,在一个示例中,我们解决了文献中的一个未解决的问题,即在S-BGP中执行劫持何时等同于执行拦截。

英文摘要:

Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks. Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow. We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g., we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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