AC电力系统中的复杂需求背包问题及激励
Complex-Demand Knapsack Problems and Incentives in AC Power Systems
摘要:
我们考虑交流电气系统,其中每个电气设备具有表示为复数的功率需求,并且总功率供应的大小有限制。出于这种情况下,我们介绍了复杂的需求背包问题(C-KP),一个新的变化的传统背包问题,其中每个项目都与一个需求作为一个复数,而不是一个实数通常被解释为重量或大小的项目。在保持相同的目标,以最大限度地提高所选项目的价值之和,我们把容量限制在满足的需求之和的大小。对于C-KP,我们证明了它的不可逼近性的FPTAS(除非P = NP),以及提出了(1/2-ε)-近似算法。此外,我们研究了自私的多代理设置,每个代理人负责一个项目,和代理人可能会误报的需求和价值,他的项目为自己的利益。我们展示了一种简单的方法来将我们的近似算法调整为单调的,这足以满足激励兼容支付的存在,使得没有代理人有误报的动机。我们的研究结果揭示了智能电网的多代理系统的设计。
英文摘要:
We consider AC electrical systems where each electrical device has a power demand expressed as a complex number, and there is a limit on the magnitude of total power supply. Motivated by this scenario, we introduce the complex-demand knapsack problem (C-KP), a new variation of the traditional knapsack problem, where each item is associated with a demand as a complex number, rather than a real number often interpreted as weight or size of the item. While keeping the same goal as to maximize the sum of values of the selected items, we put the capacity limit on the magnitude of the sum of satisfied demands. For C-KP, we prove its inapproximability by FPTAS (unless P = NP), as well as presenting a (1/2-epsilon)-approximation algorithm. Furthermore, we investigate the selfish multi-agent setting where each agent is in charge of one item, and an agent may misreport the demand and value of his item for his own interest. We show a simple way to adapt our approximation algorithm to be monotone, which is sufficient for the existence of incentive compatible payments such that no agent has an incentive to misreport. Our results shed insight on the design of multi-agent systems for smart grid.
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