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arXiv 1203.0699cs.AIcs.GT
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歧义语言与信仰差异

Ambiguous Language and Differences in Beliefs

Cornell University(康奈尔大学);Northwestern University(西北大学)

Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets

摘要:

多智能体模态逻辑的标准模型没有捕捉到这样一个事实,即信息通常是模糊的,并且可能被不同的智能体以不同的方式解释。我们提出了一个框架,可以模拟这一点,并考虑不同的语义,捕捉不同的假设代理人的信念是否有歧义。我们认为模糊性的影响,在经济学中的一个开创性的结果:奥曼的结果说,代理人有一个共同的先验不能同意不同意。这一结果是已知的不举行,如果代理人没有一个共同的先验,我们表明,它也不存在歧义。然后,我们考虑假设一个共同的解释(即,无歧义)和共同先验(即,最初的信念)。

英文摘要:

Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different semantics that capture different assumptions about the agents' beliefs regarding whether or not there is ambiguity. We consider the impact of ambiguity on a seminal result in economics: Aumann's result saying that agents with a common prior cannot agree to disagree. This result is known not to hold if agents do not have a common prior; we show that it also does not hold in the presence of ambiguity. We then consider the tradeoff between assuming a common interpretation (i.e., no ambiguity) and a common prior (i.e., shared initial beliefs).

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