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arXiv 1401.2011cs.AIcs.GTcs.LO
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一种推理歧义的逻辑

A logic for reasoning about ambiguity

Cornell University(康奈尔大学);Northwestern University(西北大学)

Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets

摘要:

多智能体模态逻辑的标准模型没有捕捉到这样的事实,即信息通常是\emph{ambiguous},并且可以由不同的智能体以不同的方式解释。我们提出了一个框架,可以模拟这一点,并考虑不同的语义,捕捉不同的假设代理人的信念是否有歧义。我们研究的表达能力的逻辑的歧义相比,逻辑不能建模的歧义,相对于我们提出的不同的语义。

英文摘要:

Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often \emph{ambiguous}, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different semantics that capture different assumptions about the agents' beliefs regarding whether or not there is ambiguity. We examine the expressive power of logics of ambiguity compared to logics that cannot model ambiguity, with respect to the different semantics that we propose.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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