有限理性厂商的合作寡头博弈
Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
摘要：
我们分析有限理性企业的合作古诺博弈。由于认知的限制，联盟的成员不能准确地预测非成员的联盟结构。因此，它们使用简单的矩阵来计算它们的值。特别是，他们分配各种非平衡概率分布在局外人的分区集。我们构造了在这样的环境中的联盟的特征函数，我们分析了相应的游戏的核心。我们表明，核心是非空的公司在市场上的数量是足够大的。此外，我们表明，如果两个分布在一组分区是相关的通过一阶优势，然后在支配分布下的游戏的核心是一个子集的核心下占主导地位的分布。
英文摘要：
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using simple heuris- tics. In particular, they assign various non-equilibrium probability distributions over the outsiders' set of partitions. We construct the characteristic function of a coalition in such an environment and we analyze the core of the corresponding games. We show that the core is non-empty provided the number of firms in the market is sufficiently large. Moreover, we show that if two distributions over the set of partitions are related via first-order dominance, then the core of the game under the dominated distribution is a subset of the core under the dominant distribution.
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