隐私感知的机制设计
Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design
摘要：
在传统的机制设计中，代理人只关心他们从机制的结果中获得的效用。我们看一个更丰富的模型，代理也分配非负的非实用性的信息，他们的私有类型泄漏的机制的结果。我们提出了一个新的模型，隐私意识的机制设计，我们只假设一个上限的代理商的损失，由于泄漏，而不是以前的工作，其中需要一个完整的表征损失。在这个模型中，在一个温和的假设下，代理人如何重视他们的隐私分布，我们展示了一个通用的隐私感知机制的建设，并证明其适用于电子投票和数字商品的定价。
英文摘要：
In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types leaked by the outcome of the mechanism. We present a new model for privacy-aware mechanism design, where we only assume an upper bound on the agents' loss due to leakage, as opposed to previous work where a full characterization of the loss was required. In this model, under a mild assumption on the distribution of how agents value their privacy, we show a generic construction of privacy-aware mechanisms and demonstrate its applicability to electronic polling and pricing of a digital good.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
